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   1
EFFECTS OF DECOUPLING ON THE AVERAGE AND THE 





Previous research has ignored the influence of inputs on output risk when assessing the 
effects of decoupled income-support payments on production decisions. This paper 
studies the impacts of agricultural policy decoupling on output variability and mean by 
explicitly considering the influence of agricultural input use on the stochastic 
component of production. We develop a theoretical framework that studies production 
responses of agricultural producers to apparently decoupled payments. Results show 
that, under DARA preferences, government transfers will have the effect of increasing 
production risk. Inferences on the effects of payments on output mean are also made. In 
our empirical application we use farm-level data collected in Kansas to illustrate the 
model.   
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Recent years have witnessed important agricultural policy reforms worldwide. These reforms have 
usually been adopted in the context of protectionist trade policy dismantling processes mandated by 
global and/or regional trade agreements, and have been characterized by a certain degree of 
decoupling. Decoupling is a term used to designate the process that consists of breaking the linkage 
between farm income-support measures and farmers’ production decisions. A common objective 
behind decoupling is the reduction of efficiency losses usually associated to coupled policies such as 
price supports or deficiency payments (Chambers, 1995). 
  The literature on production impacts of agricultural policies has shown that, in the context of a 
deterministic world or when agents are neutral to risk, only those policies that alter relative market 
prices impact on farmers’ decisions. Several studies have assessed the effects of coupled or partially 
decoupled policies assuming risk neutrality (see, for example, Moro and Sckokai, 1999;  or 
Guyomard, Baudry, and Carpentier, 1996). A recent paper by Serra et al. (2005) concludes that the 
partially decoupled compensatory payments introduced by the 1992 reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) can intensify production practices by stimulating an increase in the 
consumption of inputs such as pesticides. The use of a risk neutral theoretical framework to study the 
impacts of more recent decoupled instruments such as the production flexibility contracts introduced 
in the US in 1996, or the single farm payment defined by the 2003 CAP reform, would lead to the 
conclusion that these income-support mechanisms are fully decoupled as they do not have any impact 
on farmers’ production decisions. However, in a world with uncertainty, apparently decoupled 
payments can have production implications. An extensive literature has shown that lump sum 
payments can affect economic agents’ risk attitudes by altering farm household wealth (see, for 
example Sandmo, 1971; Just and Zilberman, 1986; Bar-Shira, Just, and Zilberman, 1997;  or 
Hennessy, 1998). This effect is known as the wealth effect of policy. Specifically, the literature 
(Hennessy, 1998) shows that if farmers have decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) preferences, a 
decoupled program that increases expected profits will increase input use as the magnitude of support 
increases.  
  The conclusion that decoupled payments will yield an increase in input use, derives from a model 
that does not account for the effects that inputs can have on the stochastic component of production. 
As Just and Pope (1978) explain, agricultural inputs can increase or decrease output variability. These 
authors propose a stochastic specification of input-output response to correctly capture this matter. Our   2
paper investigates the impacts of decoupled policies on production decisions taken by risk adverse 
agents, by explicitly considering the effects of input on output variability. Our conceptual framework 
is based on the model of production under uncertainty developed by Leathers and Quiggin (1991). We 
extend this model to allow for decoupled government transfers. We also extend their comparative 
statics analysis to derive policy-induced changes on output mean and variability. Our framework 
offers an improved picture of farmers’ behaviour by assessing the effects of policy instruments on 
input consumption, production mean and risk. Following Newbery and Stiglitz (1979), and Bar-Shira, 
Just, and Zilberman (1997), risk preferences are approximated through a function of expanded wealth. 
Under the assumption of DARA preferences, we show that an increase in lump sum payments will 
boost input use only if the input is risk-increasing. However, if the input has the effect of reducing 
output variance, its use will decline. Hence, we conclude that lump sum payments in agriculture will 
increase output variability. Implications of decoupled payments for the output mean are also derived. 
Our model shows the relevance of accounting for the effects of input on the stochastic element of 
output when studying production effects of policy measures. It also shows that the net effects of 
decoupling cannot always be predicted by theory, which makes it necessary to resolve the question by 
empirical study. In this paper we learn from the American experience on decoupling by assessing the 
effects of the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act on production decisions taken 
by a sample of Kansas farms.  
 
 
Conceptual Framework  
 
In order to analyze how decoupled payments may influence farm production decisions we extend 
Leathers and Quiggin (1991) model of production. Because production decisions are often subject to 
uncertainty, we consider producers’ risk preferences. Output variability is explicitly modelled in order 
to account for the effects of agricultural inputs on the stochastic component of output. A decoupled 
payment is defined as an income-support payment exogenously determined and not conditional upon 
actual production or prices.  
  Suppose a single-output firm produces output  y . Following Just and Pope (1978), the single-
output production function is represented by  ε y =f(x)+h(x) , where  x  is a variable input,
1     f(x) is the 
deterministic component of production,    h(x) is a function that captures the relationship between inputs 
and output variability, and ε  is a stochastic disturbance with    E(ε)= 0  and    E(ε
2)=1. An input will 
cause production risk to increase (stay constant) [decrease] if 
 
var y    x > (=) <    0, where 
 
var y    x 
represents the first derivative of output variance with respect to input  x .
2 Different examples have 
been cited of risk-increasing and risk-decreasing inputs. Frost protection, irrigation or pesticides, have 
generally been considered by previous literature as inputs that reduce output variability, while 
fertilizers have often been associated to an increase in production risk (Just and Pope, 1978; or Just 
and Zilberman, 1983). It should be noted however, that pesticides have also been seen by many 
authors as risk-increasing (Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1994) or risk-neutral inputs (Hurd, 1994).  













EuW 0 + pf(x)+ ph(x)ε -wX+gov ( )    , where  W  
represents farm’s total wealth,    W0 stands for farm’s initial wealth,  p  is the market output price,  w  is 
the variable input price, and  gov  represent decoupled government payments. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that output and input prices are certain variables, with the agricultural output being the only 
source of uncertainty. The first order condition of the expected utility maximization problem can be 
expressed as: 
 
                                                 
1 A single input is used in this theoretical model for the sake of simplicity. However, in the empirical application 
the model is generalized and two inputs are considered. 
2 See Ramaswami (1992) for an alternative though compatible definition of risk-increasing and risk-decreasing 
inputs.   3
 
 
∂Eu ( W )    
∂x
=E u W pyx -w ()     =0 (1) 
 
 
Subscripts in (1) denote partial derivatives. Following Newbery and Stiglitz (1979),  uW  can be 
expanded around expected wealth, 
 W= W 0 +p y -wx + gov . This yields the following expression: 
 uW =uW +uWW(W -W) =uW +uWWp(y - y), where  uW  and  uWW  represent the first and second-order 
derivatives of the utility function evaluated at the expected wealth ( W ), and  y  represents farmer’s 









2Ey - y () yx     =w (2) 
 
 
It can be shown that  
 
Ey - y ( )yx     is equivalent to one half the derivative of the output variance with 
respect to  x , i.e. 
 
Ey - y () yx     = 1
2 () var y    x





. Following Bar-Shira, Just and Zilberman (1997), we assume that  R  is a function of a farm’s 






β , where η  and β  
are parameters. If farmers are risk-averse, then  η >0 (which involves  R >0), a risk-neutral behaviour 
would imply  η =0 ( R =0), while  η <0 ( R <0) represents a risk-seeking attitude. We assume farmers 
to be risk-averse ( η >0). β  is the wealth elasticity of absolute risk aversion. If farmers have 
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) preferences,  β <0. Increasing absolute risk aversion 
(IARA) preferences are represented by  β >0, while constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) attitudes 
involve  β =0 (see Chavas, 2004, chapter 4 for more detail). We assume here that farmers have DARA 
preferences ( β <0). It is important to note that our measure of risk aversion based on expected wealth 
is only an approximation to farmer’s actual risk preferences. This approximation does not change with 
different realizations of the random output because it is measured at its expected value, but varies with 
the level of the farmer’s expected wealth. Substituting the coefficient of absolute risk aversion as a 





pE yx    - 1
2 () ηW
βp
2var y    x =w (3) 
 
 
Equation (3) can also be expressed as: 
 
 





CE = pE yx    - 1
2 () ηW
βp
2var y    x = EM I    -RP is the certainty equivalent of marginal income, 
 
EM I     =p E y x     is the expected value of the marginal output, 
 
RP = 1
2 ( ) ηW
βp
2var y    x
 represents the risk 
premium, and   MC=w is the marginal cost of using an additional unit of input. Equation (4) shows   4
that the maximization of the expected utility requires the certainty equivalent of marginal income be 
equal to the marginal cost ( MC ).
3 Comparative statics are used below in order to determine the effects 
of government payments on input use and output variability
4 and mean.  
  Farmers in our model have two income sources: decoupled government transfers and market 
revenue. Agricultural policy in developed countries has usually involved price-support measures that 
keep market prices artificially high. As explained above, price supports represent a form of coupled 
income-support. Given the fact that we do not have experimental data that allows to compare two 
situations, one with only coupled and the other with exclusively decoupled support, we compare the 
effects of decoupled payments with the effects of prices representing a coupled element of support. 
For comparison purposes, we also assess the effects of a change in input prices on farmers’ production 
decisions. Throughout the comparative statics analysis, it is assumed that farmers are decreasingly 
absolute risk averse and that the expected marginal productivity of input is positive. 
The effects of decoupled government payments on input use can be derived by totally 











2var y    x
Eu (W)    xx
=
RPgov





   
Eu (W)    xx = pE yxx    − 1
2 () ηβW




2var y    x − 1
2 ( ) ηW
βp
2var y    xx <0 represents the 
second order condition of the optimization problem, and 
 
RPgov is the marginal government transfer 
effect of risk premium. The sign of (5) depends on the sign of the numerator, which in turn depends on 
the sign of 
 
var y    x
. If 
   
var y    x >(=)[<]0  then 
   
dx
dgov
>(=)[<]0. An increase in decoupled government 
payments will result in an increase in farm households’ wealth, which will induce a reduction in 
farmers’ degree of risk aversion. Given this change in risk preferences, farmers will increase the 
demand for risk-increasing inputs, while reducing the application of the risk-reducing ones. This 
result, which is compatible with the findings of MacMinn and Holtmann (1983), shows that the risk 
premium will decrease if x  is a risk-increasing input, but will grow if x  reduces output risk. 





   
dvar y    
dgov
=






RPgovvar y    x




Under our assumption of DARA preferences, 
   
dvar y    
dgov
>0 which shows that an increase in subsidies 
will increase output risk. Adjustments in output mean to changes in government payments can be 
expressed as: 
                                                 
3 Consistently with Pope and Kramer’s (1979) work, equation (3) shows that if an input is risk-reducing 
(increasing) and economic agents are risk averse, the expected value of marginal output will need to be smaller 
(greater) than the input price in order to maximize the expected utility. 
4 An input could have different impacts on marginal and on average risk. For instance, while pesticides can 
reduce total risk, they may increase risk at the margin. As Hurley, Mitchell, and Rice (2004) explain, risk at the 
margin is of primary concern to farmers. Our analysis is at the margin and thus focuses on the impacts of 
decoupling on output marginal risk.    5
 














The sign of expression (7) depends entirely on 
 
var y    x . Consistently with changes in input 
consumption, output  mean  will  grow (stay  constant)  [decline]  with  lump sum  payments if 
 
var y    x  
>(=) <    0. The comparative statics developed above lead to the following proposition: 
 
 
PROPOSITION 1. Under the assumption of DARA preferences and positive expected marginal 
productivity (
     





>= ()<    0  if 
 
var y    x  
 
>= ()<    0  
B. 
 




   
dE[y]
dgov  
>= ()<    0  if 
 
var y    x  
 
>= ()<    0 . 
 
 
The impact of a change in output prices on input consumption can be derived by totally 








Ey x    − 1
2 () ηβW





 var y    x
Eu (W)    xx
=−
Ey x    −RPp





   
RPp = 1
2 () ηβW





 var y    x
, the marginal price effect of the risk premium, 
shows that a change in output price has two effects on the risk premium. The first effect, the risk 
aversion effect, measures the risk premium adjustment to a modification to a farmer’s risk preferences 
in response to a change in output prices. The second effect, the price-variance effect, captures the risk 
premium adjustment to a change in a farm’s income risk caused by an output price change. If we 
ignore the influence of inputs on the stochastic element of production, the first effect will be negative 
(
   
1
2 () ηβW
β−1Ey    p
2 <0), while the second will be positive (   ηW
βp > 0). However, both effects must be 
corrected by the influence of input on the output’s variance (
   
var y    x
). If  x  is a risk-increasing input, 
the signs of the two effects will not change. However, if  x  is risk-decreasing, the two effects will 
work in opposite directions. If the difference between the expected marginal output and the change in 
the risk premium is positive (
     
Ey x    − RPp > 0), the demand for input  x  will increase. Otherwise, the 
demand will decline. This lays out the necessary conditions for a failure in the ‘law of supply’, that 
contends that the quantity supplied by price-taking producers will rise in response to an increase in 
output prices. An increase in profit risk above the increase in its mean will originate this failure. This 
result is in accord with the findings of Just and Zilberman (1986) and represents an extension of their 
work.  
The sensitivity of output variance with respect to output prices can be computed as: 
   6
 
   
dvar y    
dp
=






Ey x    −RPp ( ) var y    x




An increase in output variance involves 
   
dvar y    
dp
>0. If input  x  is risk-increasing, this condition will be 
met when 
     
Ey x    − RPp > 0, i.e., when the expected marginal income is above the marginal risk 
premium. If, on the other hand, input  x  is risk-decreasing, condition 
   
dvar y    
dp
>0 will require 
     
Ey x    − RPp < 0 in which case the use of  x  will decline therefore boosting output variability. The 
inverse is true for the case where  
   
dvar y    
dp
<0. The sensitivity of output mean with respect to output 






















The sign of expression (10) depends on the sign of 
 
Ey x    − RPp . As shown before, if the difference is 
positive, input use will grow, which in turn will increase output mean. Otherwise, production will 
decline. As noted, this latter case involves the failure of the ‘law of supply.’ Expressions (8) to (10) 
allow formulating proposition number 2 as follows.  
 
 
PROPOSITION 2. Under the assumption of DARA preferences and positive expected marginal 
productivity (
     





>= ()<    0  if 
     
Ey x    − RPp > (=) <    0 
B. 
 
dvar y    
dp
 >0 if      
   
var y    x >(<)0 and 
 
Ey x    − RPp > (<)0  
   
 
dvar y    
dp
 <0 if 
   
var y    x >(<)0 and 
     
Ey x    − RPp < (>)0 
   
 
dvar y    
dp
 =0 if 
     
Ey x    − RPp = 0 
C. 
   
dE[y]
dp  
>= ()<    0  if 
     
Ey x    − RPp > (=) <    0  
 
 
By totally differentiating equation (3), we can also assess the effects of input prices on input 
consumption: 
 
   7
 







2var y    x
Eu (W)    xx
=
1−RPw









2 var y    x
 represents the marginal effect of input price on the risk 




 depends on 
   
var y    x
. If 
   
var y    x >0, i.e. the input is risk-increasing, the 
numerator of expression (11) will be positive, which involves an increase in the risk premium and a 
reduction in the demand for  x . However, if 
   
var y    x <0 , i.e. the input is risk-reducing, the net effect of 
a change in input price on input use will depend on whether 
   
RPw ≥ <1. Proposition 3 thus contemplates 
the possibility of a positively slopped demand for inputs, which again is compatible with and 
represents an extension of the work by Just and Zilberman (1986). The sensitivity of output variance 




   
dvar y    
dw
=






1−RPw ( ) var y    x




As shown above, if 
   
var y    x >0 then 
   
dx
dw
<0 and thus 
   
dvar y    
dw
<0, which involves that when risk-
increasing inputs become more costly, production variance will be reduced. However, if 
   
var y    x <0, 
production variance will increase (decrease) if 
   
RPw <(>)1. This last result is expected since when 
   
RPw <1, the use of the risk-decreasing input slows down and raises output risk. Conversely, when 
   
RPw >1 
the use of risk-decreasing inputs increases lowering output risk. The sensitivity of output mean with 













1−RPw    E[yx]




The sign of expression (13) depends on the sign of 
   
1−RPw . As explained before, if  x  is a risk-
increasing input, 
   
1−RPw >0 thus making 
   
dE[y]
dw
<0. However, if the input is risk-decreasing, the sign of 
   
1−RPw  cannot be anticipated, which indicates that output mean could either increase or decrease. 
Expressions (11) to (13) lead to our third proposition: 
 
 
PROPOSITION 3. Under the assumption of DARA preferences and positive expected marginal 
productivity (
     





 <0 if 
   
var y    x >0 . If 
   
var y    x <0 , 
 
dx
dw  >(=)[<]0 if 
   
RPw >(=) <    1   8
B. 
 
dvar y    
dw
 <0 if 
   
var y    x >0 . If 
   
var y    x <0 , 
 
dvar y    
dw  <(=)[>]0 if 
   
RPw >(=) <    1 
C. 
 
dE y    
dw
 <0 if 
   
var y    x >0 . If 
   
var y    x <0 , 
 
dE y    
dw  >(=)[<]0 if 
   
RPw >(=) <    1. 
 
 
The comparative statics developed above show the relevance of accounting for the influence of 
inputs on output risk when studying supply effects of decoupling. We show that, contrary to what 
previous analyses have concluded, an increase in lump sum payments does not necessarily motivate an 
increase in input use. Specifically, we show that under DARA preferences, input demand will increase 
if the input is risk-increasing, but will decline if it is risk-decreasing. The comparative statics analysis 
also shows that the net effects of decoupling cannot always be predicted by theory, making it 
necessary to resolve the question empirically. In the next sections we carry out an empirical analysis. 
A parametric representation of the model is specified and estimated using farm-level data for a sample 





Generalizing the model outlined in the previous section, we define  y  as a function of two inputs 
   
x1 
and 
   
x2 , where 
   
x1 represents the quantity used of pesticides and 
   
x2  measures the fertilizer applied. In 
order to adequately capture the particular role of pesticides as damage-control inputs, we adopt the 
Lichtenberg-Zilberman damage control technology model. Following previous literature on damage 
abatement (Babcock, Lichtenberg, and Zilberman, 1992; Carrasco and Moffit, 1992; Lichtenberg and 
Zilberman, 1986; Oude Lansink and Carpentier, 2001; or Chambers and Lichtenberg, 1994), the 
deterministic component of production is defined as a concave function in which the abatement 
activity enters multiplicatively 
   
f(x1,x2)= g(x1)*s(x2). Function 
   
g(x1)  defines the role of damage control 
agents to production in terms of their capacity to reduce crop damage. It is represented by a 
nondecreasing concave function. Because abatement cannot exceed potential output (Lichtenberg and 
Zilberman, 1986), function 
   
g(x1)  must be defined in the (0,1) interval, with 
   
g(x1)=1 representing 
perfect pest abatement and 
   
g(x1)= 0 denoting no abatement. Since data on damage abatement are rarely 
observed, the usual practice is to specify a parametric representation of 
   
g(x1). Following previous 
analyses on damage control in agriculture (Chambers and Lichtenberg, 1994; Lichtenberg and 
Zilberman, 1986; Babcock, Lichtenberg, and Zilberman, 1992; Carpentier and Weaver, 1997), we 
adopt the exponential function: 
   
g(x1)=(1−e
−α1x1 ), where  
α1 is a parameter. Function 
   
s(x2) represents 
maximum potential output when damage abatement levels are equal to 1. It is assumed that 
   
s(x2) 
follows a Cobb-Douglas specification and is defined as: 
   
s(x2)=α0x2
α2 , with 
 
α0  and 
 
α2  being 
parameters. 
  The stochastic component of  y , i.e. 
   
h(x1,x2), is a measure of the standard error of production, 
being 
   
h
2(x1,x2) the output variance: 
   





2(x1,x2). The parametric representation of 
variance is defined
5 as: 








γ 0,γ 1,γ 2,γ 11,and  
γ 22  are parameters . 
Output mean and variance functions are estimated using a three-stage feasible generalized least 
                                                 
5 It is important to note that different specifications for both the output mean and variance were considered. We 
settled with the ones that yielded results consistent with economic theory. The different specifications considered 
include translog, CES, and quadratic forms.    9
squares procedure outlined in Just and Pope (1978).
6 Once the production function is specified, the 












EuW 0 +p α0(1−e
−α1x1 )x2
α2 +p e
γ 0 +γ1x1+γ 2x2 +γ11x1
2 +γ 22x2
2













. s shown in the 
conceptual framework section, the first-order conditions of the optimization problem 
 
∂Eu ( W )    
∂x
=0 can 
be reduced to mean-variance equations of the form: 
 
pE yx    - 1
2 ( ) ηW
βp
2var y    x =w. By replacing the 
expressions 
 
Ey x     and 
 
var y    x by their parametric representations, the following system of first-order 
conditions can be derived: 
 
 







γ 0 +γ1x1+γ 2x2+γ11x1
2+γ 22x2







γ 0 +γ1x1+γ 2x2+γ11x1
2+γ 22x2










Parameters that represent producers’ risk preferences (η  and β ) are derived through the estimation of 
the system of equations (14) using maximum likelihood. Parameters of the production function are not 
re-estimated and are taken from the results of applying a three-stage feasible generalized least squares 
to estimate 
   
y =f(x1,x2)+h(x1,x2)ε .  
  In order to determine the effects of decoupling on output variability and mean, we compute the 
elasticities of output variance and mean with respect to government payments, output prices and, for 
comparison purposes, input prices. These elasticities are constructed based on the generalization of 
formulas (6), (7), (9), (10), (12), and (13) derived from the comparative statics analysis to a two-input 
model
7 and can be expressed as: 
   
evar[y] _gov =
dvar y    
dgov
gov
var y    
, 
   
evar[y] _ p =
dvar y    
dp
p
var y    
, 
   
evar[y] _wi
=
dvar y    
dwi
wi
var y    
 , 
   
eE[y] _gov =
dE y    
dgov
gov
Ey    
, 
   
eE[y] _ p =
dE y    
dp
p
Ey    
, and 
   
eE[y] _wi
=
dE y    
dwi
wi
Ey    
. 
 





As noted above, significant agricultural policy reforms worldwide have often involved a certain degree 
of decoupling. The US farm policy underwent an extensive reform in 1996. The passage of the Federal 
Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act involved a reduction in the coupled element of 
income supports. Price supports were cut in favour of Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments 
that did not require the production of certain crops and were not linked to actual production or prices, 
and a deficiency payment that guaranteed a minimum support price for program crops.  
                                                 
6 Though we tried to estimate the production function by maximum likelihood techniques, the optimization 
process did not converge.  
7 The generalization of the model to allow for more than one input increases the complexity of the comparative 
statics results. Whether the inputs are complements or substitutes becomes an important factor (see Pope and 
Kramer, 1979 for further detail) and does not allow to draw a clear conclusion about the sign of formulas  (5) to 
(13). Empirical results are thus necessary to determine the effects of government payments and prices on output 
mean and variability.   10
  Our empirical application focuses on the analysis of the effects of US agricultural policy 
decoupling on production decisions taken by a sample of Kansas farms. Farm-level data are obtained 
from farm account records from the Kansas Farm Management Association database for the period 
1998-2001. Retrospective data for these farms are also used to define some lagged variables used in 
the analysis.
8 Our period of study corresponds to a time during which the FAIR Act was in force. PFC 
payments correspond to our definition of decoupled payments.  
  Our analysis is based on farm-level data, but aggregates are also used to define important 
variables that are unavailable in the farm-level dataset. These aggregates are taken from the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). 
USDA provided state-level PFC payment rates and NASS facilitated country-level price indices and 
state-level output prices and quantities. 
  Table 1 contains summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. Two variable inputs are 
considered. Input 
   
x1 includes pesticides and insecticides and 
   
x2  represents fertilizer. Input prices (
   
w1 
and 
   
w2) are measured using national price indices because they are unavailable in the Kansas dataset. 
Thus, 
   
x1 and 
   
x2  are defined as implicit quantity indices and computed as the ratio of input use in 
currency units to its corresponding price indices. 
 
 




y   104,315.98 
(120,636.51) 
p  0.91 
(0.06) 
X1  14,209.34  
(17,177.62) 
w1  0.99 
(0.01) 
X2   18,809.25  
(20,829.04) 
w2   1.00 
(0.06) 
gov  11,412.08 
(9,337.62) 
 Wealth   656,214.29 
(577,944.67) 
Note: all monetary values are expressed in constant 1998 currency units 
 
 
  A single output category ( y ) is also defined as a quantity index. Variable  y  aggregates the 
production of the predominant crops in Kansas (wheat, corn, grain sorghum, and soybeans). The 
output price  p  is defined as an aggregate Paasche index representing actual market prices. To build 
the Paasche index, unit prices for the crops considered are defined as state-level output prices. State-
level production is also employed to derive the price index.  
  The Kansas database does not separate government payments into the component payments. 
Instead, a single measure that includes all government payments received by each farm is available. 
To derive an estimate of farm-level PFC payments, program crops base acreage and base yield are 
approximated using farm-level data. The approximation uses the 1986-88 average acreage and yield 
                                                 
8 To be able to do so, a complete panel is built out of our sample.   11
for each program crop and farm. PFC payments per crop are derived by multiplying 0.85 by the base 
acreage, yield and the PFC payment rate. PFC payments per crop are then added to get total direct 
payments per farm. Estimated direct payments are compared to actual government payments received 
by each farm. In case estimated PFC payments exceed total actual payments, the first measure is 
replaced by the second.
9 Farms’ initial wealth (
   





Parameter estimates for the deterministic element of production, 
   
f(x1,x2), are all statistically significant 
and have the expected sign. The pest damage abatement parameter estimate (
 
α1) allows to compute 
the value of the damage abatement function 
   
g(x1)=(1−e
−α1x1 ), which is 0.87 at the data means. This 














 α0   678.0000**  
(145.5000)     
 
 α1  1.4500E-04**  
(1.3000E-05) 
 
 α2  0.5405**  
(0.0193) 
 




















F-Statistic 1662.4500**  180.2300** 
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the α = 0.1 level 
Two asterisks (**) denote statistical significance at the α = 0.05 level 
 
 
Parameter estimates representing the stochastic component of production, 
   
g(x1,x2), show that 
both inputs exert a statistically significant influence on output variability. Their influence follows an 
inverted ‘U’ shape. At the data means, 
   
var y    xi
=h
2(xi)xi
>0 for i = 1,2, which involves that both inputs 
are, on average, risk-increasing. The literature has often considered fertilizers as an example of inputs 
that increase output variability. However, pesticides have been widely believed to reduce production 
risk. As Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1994) explain, the analyses that support the hypothesis that 
pesticides are risk-reducing (see, for example, Feder, 1979), are based on the assumption that pest 
                                                 
9 This happens in 7% of our observations.   12
damage is independent of other elements influencing output. Using a model that explicitly accounts 
for the interdependence between pesticides and other production conditions, Horowitz and 
Lichtenberg (1994) show that pesticides may in fact be risk-increasing in a variety of circumstances. 
Specifically, pesticides will increase output variability whenever pest populations tend to increase with 
good crop growth conditions. In such a situation, the use of pesticides will result in an increase in 
production in already good states of nature, thus increasing output risk. These theoretical results 
provide a very useful instrument for interpreting our empirical findings, which are compatible with 
previous research. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993), for example, show that farmers with crop 
insurance tend to use more pesticides, which is expected for a risk-increasing input. Farnsworth and 
Moffit (1981) also find pesticides to increase cotton yield risk in California. 
 
 
Table 3. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for the coefficients of risk aversion. 
Parameter  Mean predicted value 
(Standard deviation) 
η   0.0224** 
(0.0050) 
β   -0.30178** 
   (0.0177) 
Wald test ( η = 0 and  β = 0)  441461** 
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the α = 0.1 level 
Two asterisks (**) denote statistical significance at the α = 0.05 level 
 
 
  Parameter estimates for the system of first-order conditions (14) are presented in Table 3. They 
provide evidence that farmers in our sample exhibit DARA preferences ( η>0  and  β <0 ). Previous 
studies have also found evidence that farmers are decreasingly absolute risk averse (see for example 
Bar-Shira, Just and Zilberman, 1997; or Chavas and Holt, 1990). Elasticities of output risk and mean 
with respect to decoupled government payments, output, and input prices are computed at the data 
means.
10 Results are offered in table 4. As noted before, both 
   
x1 and 
   
x2  have the effect of increasing 
output variability at the data means. Thus, and in accordance to what our theoretical model predicts, 
demand for 
   
x1 and 
   
x2  will increase with an increase in lump sum payments, thus raising output risk. 
Output mean will grow as well, but with a relative magnitude below the variance. It is important to 
note that, in spite of the fact that decoupled payments exert a statistically significant influence on the 
output mean and variance, elasticity values are very small indicating that substantial changes in 
payments are required to generate perceptible changes in production and production risk. Also, as 
predicted by theory, the use of both inputs will increase with a decline in their respective prices thus 
raising production variance and mean. Relative changes in output variance will be more substantial 
than changes in the output mean. Elasticities also show that a reduction in output price supports will 
motivate an increase in 
   
x1 and 
   
x2  use and an increase production variance. This last result involves 
that, at the data means, the price-variance effect outweighs the sum of the change in the expected 
marginal income and the risk aversion effect. The output mean price elasticity is also negative at the 
data means, thus indicating that an increase in prices may reduce agricultural production.  
Thus, from the empirical results above we conclude that, for our sample of Kansas farms, a 
decoupling process consisting of a reduction in price-support measures in favour of lump sum 
payments, may have the effect of boosting output variance and mean by increasing the use of risk-
increasing inputs. Our results also show that, relative to price supports, lump-sum payments cause 
only very small distortions on production, requiring very large changes in these payments to generate 
                                                 
10 In order to determine whether these elasticities are significant, we use a bootstrapping approach. To do so, we 
utilize 1,000 pseudo-samples of the same size of the actual sample, drawn with replacement, to provide a sample 
of elasticity estimates. The variance and the elasticity values are derived from the variance and the mean of the 
replicated elasticities.   13
perceptible effects. It is important to note, however, that our results need to be interpreted with care. 
The stochastic element of production has been specified as a function that only depends on input use. 
The variability of output, however, is also likely to depend on other issues such as the variability in 
crop growth conditions (temperature, precipitation, sunshine duration, etc.), or the fluctuations in pest 
levels. Both sources of uncertainty, which we do not observe, may play a relevant role and interact 
with the effects of input use on output variance.  
 
 
Table 4. Elasticity estimates  
Elasticity Mean  value 
(Standard deviation) 
   
evar[y] _gov   0.00448** 
(0.00001) 
   
evar[y] _ p   -1.28558** 
(0.00571) 
   
evar[y] _w1
  -0.04661 ** 
(0.00002) 
   
evar[y] _w2
  -0.17101** 
(0.00015) 
   
eE[y] _gov   0.00208** 
(0.00001) 
   
eE[y] _ p   -0.59390** 
(0.00272) 
   
eE[y] _w1
  -0.03011** 
(0.00007) 
   
eE[y] _w2
  -0.07414** 
(0.00004) 
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the α = 0.1 level 





This paper investigates the effects of decoupling on farmers’ production decisions and, specifically, on 
output variability and mean. Previous literature (Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1994; Feder, 1979; Just 
and Pope, 1978) has explained that input use will not only alter output mean, but it may also affect 
output risk. To the extent that farmers are not neutral to risk, the analysis of policy effects should 
explicitly consider the contribution of agricultural inputs on the stochastic element of production.  
  To consider this matter we use an extended version of Leathers and Quiggin (1991) model  of 
production under uncertainty that allows for decoupled income supports. We also extend their 
comparative statics analysis to derive policy-induced changes on output mean and variability. Our 
framework offers an improved picture of farmers’ behaviour by assessing the effects of policy 
instruments on input consumption, production mean and risk. The theoretical model shows that under 
the assumption that farmers are characterized by DARA preferences, an increase in decoupled 
payments will only increase input use if the input is risk-increasing. However, if it is risk-decreasing, 
its use will drop. Hence, lump sum payments will result in an increase in output variability. This 
finding contrasts with previous analyses that have ignored the role of inputs in the stochastic 
component of production. These studies have concluded that an increase in lump sum payments will 
inevitably lead to an increase in input use, independently of the type of input.  We also consider the 
effects of lump sum payments on output mean. We use farm-level data collected in Kansas to illustrate 
our model. Consistent with theory, results suggest that decoupling may result in an increase in output 
variability and mean for the farms in our sample.   14
  Several directions for further work are apparent. One main area of consideration should be the 
incorporation in the model of other sources of risk that cause output to fluctuate. The function that 
represents output variability has been specified as a function that depends only on input use. However, 
it is likely that output variability also depends on other factors such as crop growth conditions and pest 
levels. These other uncertainty sources may play an important role in explaining output variability and 
may interact with the effects of input use on output fluctuations. The collection of better data to 
capture these issues would allow assessing the degree to which our results are sensitive to the model 
specification.    15
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